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Abstract 
The ability of innovation – both technical and social - to stretch and redefine ‘limits to growth’ 
was recognised at Stockholm in 1972, and has been a key feature in debates through to Rio+20 
in 2012. Compared with previous major moments of global reflection about human and 
planetary futures – Stockholm, Rio in 1992, Johannesburg in 2002 – we now have a better 
understanding of how innovation interacts with social, technological and ecological systems to 
contribute to transitions at multiple levels. What can this improved understanding offer in 
terms of governance approaches that might enhance the interaction between local initiatives 
and global sustainability objectives post-Rio+20?   
 
The global political agenda over the last two decades has largely focussed on creating economic 
and regulatory incentives to drive more sustainable industrial development patterns within and 
between nation states – resulting most notably in the CBD and the UNFCCC.  At the other end of 
the spectrum, ‘Local Agenda 21’, launched at the first Rio summit, envisaged a community-led 
response to sustainable development challenges.  Local initiatives often flourished and drew on 
people’s own, vibrant forms of knowledge, technology and experimentation, but for the most 
part they remained at the margins, focused on local sustainable development needs rather than 
articulating with bigger-picture global challenges. This paper discusses the successes and 
challenges of globally-linked local action through a number of illustrative examples, reflecting 
on how these have contributed to Rio 1992’s original objectives.  In doing so, we will draw upon 
innovation studies and development studies to highlight three key issues for the new hybrid 
politics of innovation for sustainability that is required to link global and local. First, the 
direction in which innovation and development proceed. Second, the distribution of the costs, 
benefits and risks associated with such changes. Third, the diversity of approaches and forms of 
innovation that can contribute to global transitions to sustainability.  Drawing on this analysis, 
we will also reflect on Rio+20, including the extent to which this new hybrid politics is already 
emerging, whether this was reflected in the formal Rio+20 outcomes, and what this suggests for 
the future of international sustainable development summits. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Political leaders at the first ‘earth summit’ in Stockholm in 1972 were encouraged to 
consider research agendas and technological breakthroughs that would reform industrialism. 
While this was happening, a group of activists set up an exhibition outside the main 
conference, where they displayed technologies which they saw as underpinning radical 
shifts to post-industrial, ecological societies organised at the local level (see for example, 
Harper and Boyle, 1976, Part B).  Some of the technologies on display, such as wind turbines, 
are now established as multi-billion dollar global industries in a so-called “green economy”. 
But at the time, these were positioned as alternatives to the high-tech incumbent 
approaches to energy generation that were dominated by state-supported industries and 
multi-national corporations.   
 
As STEPS Centre researchers, we participated in a variety of Rio+20 events and activities 
before, during and after the Summit, and witnessed the persistence of these dichotomies 
between incumbent and alternative innovation for sustainability, at least rhetorically. In this 
paper we reflect on our participation in those debates, and our own research, in order to 
suggest that the dichotomy actually masks a more complex picture populated by diverse, 
hybrid forms of innovation for sustainability that can serve to link local and global changes.  
Rather than counterposing what have become termed ‘industrial’ and ‘grassroots’ 
innovation approaches, we are increasingly witnessing the emergence of dynamic, hybrid 
combinations of both – shaped and facilitated by emergent private-public-NGO partnerships 
and new communications technologies. These not only offer opportunities to enable more 
sustainable and socially just ways of doing things, but also to disrupt the unsustainable 
pathways that lead us to transgress what earth scientists have called  ‘planetary boundaries’ 
(Rockström et al., 2009).  At Rio+20, these hybrid approaches were highly visible in the side 
events at Rio Centro and at the discussions at the Cúpola dos Povos (people’s summit) in 
Flamengo, where diverse political groups focussed their attention not only on supporting or 
opposing specific technological solutions, but on a local-global transition to more 
sustainable development pathways.   
 
Do these hybrid innovations bring with them a new politics? Or do they recast old political 
cleavages in new forms? To what extent did Rio+20 provide a forum for these politics to play 
out?   
 
In this paper we make an initial attempt to map out the settings for these innovation politics, 
and provide heuristics that can help us to navigate them, drawing on a range of illustrative 
examples.  We argue that the emerging politics of innovation – insufficiently addressed in 
the formal negotiations at Rio+20 - should be guided by a local-global agenda around the 
directions of innovation, the more equitable distribution of its costs, benefits and risks, and 
an appreciation of the diversity of innovation both across countries and within them.  This 
‘3D’ agenda, we argue, sets the foundation for the kind of democratisation of science, 
technology and innovation that can enable creative local responses to flourish, whilst 
providing a guide for systemic shifts towards sustainable development at the global level.  
 
Innovation at Rio+20 
 
The history of environmental summits can be viewed in terms of the contested politics of 
science, technology and innovation (STI) for more sustainable development.  At each of the 
major gatherings – Stockholm 1972, Rio 1992, Johannesburg 2002 and Rio 2012, the role of 
technological change in stretching and redefining the ecological limits of a finite planet has 
been subject to vastly divergent views (for an early example see Cole et al., 1973). 
 
Beyond the resource constraints first highlighted in the ‘Limits to Growth’ (Meadows et al., 
1972) and the biodiversity and climate change issues that were the focus  at Rio ’92, 
environmental scientists in the run-up to Rio+20 highlighted no fewer than seven additional 
‘planetary boundaries’ (Rockström et al., 2009), arguing that human activity is moving the 
earth system beyond these boundaries and outside of the climatically and ecologically-
stable state that sustained past human development through the Holocene, into zones of 
unprecedented ecological stress with unpredictable consequences.  The planetary 
boundaries were influential in focussing attention in advance of Rio, and a group of leading 
experts at the conference argued that staying within them would “require the full use of 
humanity’s capacity for innovation and creativity at both global and local level…” (emphasis 
added) within “… pathways that explicitly recognize the ecological capacity of the planet” 
(High-level Dialogue on Global Sustainability, 2012).   
 
Despite these enlightened views recognising global-local interactions and a flourishing of 
creative solutions, many of the formal debates at Rio took a more constrained and limited 
view of innovation.  The outcome document ‘The Future we Want’ contains ten instances of 
the word “innovation”, but is overwhelmingly focussed on the role of finance and the 
provision of advanced technologies from richer countries to the developing world 
(“technology transfer, as mutually agreed”) and the need to “close the technological gap 
between developing and developed countries” (UNGA, 2012, para 48).   The idea that 
innovation and solutions could emerge from the margins – for example from communities 
within developing countries - is almost absent, save only for two brief examples where the 
text recognises the ‘grassroots’ component to innovation.1   
 
Prominent in the run-up to Rio, and informing the view of innovation as a market-driven 
process in the ‘advanced’ global North, was the narrative of the ‘green economy’, a term 
discussed twenty years ago (Pearce et al., 1989, Jacobs, 1992) but more recently pushed by 
the UN Environment Programme (UNEP, 2011), and adopted widely amongst many 
                                                 
1
 With respect to biodiversity, paragraph 197 states “We recognize that the traditional knowledge, innovations 
and practices of indigenous peoples and local communities make an important contribution to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and their wider application can support social well-being and 
sustainable livelihoods.”  This paragraph is rare in its recognition that innovation is not solely the domain of 
‘developed countries,’ – a sentiment reinforced in paragraph 268 which stresses the need to “facilitate 
entrepreneurship and innovation including among women, the poor and the vulnerable.” With respect to food 
security, nutrition and sustainable agriculture paragraph 109 of the text recognises “the importance of 
traditional sustainable agricultural practices, including traditional seed supply systems, including for many 
indigenous peoples and local communities.”  However, in this as in many other areas in the outcome 
document, concrete commitments to supporting and connecting such approaches are absent.  Aside from 
these two instances, the recognition of knowledge and innovation in communities around the world is hardly 
visible at all – in stark contrast to the precedents set in some previous summits.   
governments, NGOs and business organisations.  UNEP describes the ‘green economy’ as 
“one that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly 
reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. In other words, we can think of a 
green economy as an economic environment that achieves low carbon emissions, resource 
efficiency and at the same time is socially inclusive” (UNEP, 2012).  Part of this vision 
includes the internalisation of environmental costs into mainstream economic logics, which 
can act as a driver for innovation for sustainability.  In response to this vision, some activists 
argued prior to Rio+20 that the Green Economy narrative (especially with respect to its 
potential for further commoditisation of aspects of the natural world like genetic resources 
and ecosystem functions, transforming them into ‘natural capital’) lost sight of the social 
justice dimensions of sustainable development (ETC Group, 2011).  Some of these debates 
echo the political lines drawn at earlier summits, although as we explore below how the 
‘green economy’ assumed a discursive dominance at Rio+20 that served to stifle and co-opt 
many would-be alternative positions. 
 
Science, technology, innovation and sustainability at previous international 
conferences 
 
At earlier summits, references to innovation in formal outcome documents were often 
similarly focussed at the global level.  The Stockholm Action Plan (UN Conference on the 
Human Environment, 1972, Part B) framed the role of technology at the international level 
around the UN assisting developing countries to access technologies with respect to 
monitoring devices (like satellites for forestry), and in food technologies, appropriate 
technologies for water resource management, preventing mining hazards, and new energy 
technologies.  Stockholm however saw NGO and civil society groups invited – alongside the 
113 countries and 19 inter-governmental agencies represented, over 400 inter-
governmental and non-governmental organizations were also present (Dodds et al., 2012).  
Their primary engagement took place in a semi-detached arena, known as the Environment 
Forum (or, informally, the Hog Farm), at which the 1972 People’s Summit (Björk, 2012), and 
co-ordination by activists and academics from across the world (Nilsson, 2003) provided 
radical alternatives – conceived at the local level - to the industrial, high-tech approaches 
being discussed at the formal UN Conference on the Human Environment. 
 
An undercurrent of radical alternatives and bottom-up political initiatives has persisted ever 
since, and were taken forward to Rio 1992, which saw attendance from 108 heads of state 
with 178 nations represented, 2400 representatives of NGOs, and around 10,000 journalists.  
Stakeholders at the Global Forum facilitated by the Centre for Our Common Future were 
estimated in the range 35,000 to 50,000 (Dodds et al., 2012). In Rio, the geographical divide 
between the formal negotiations (in Riocentro 40km out of town), and the NGO-civil society 
discussions at the Global Forum (in Flamengo Park) was more notable than at Stockholm, as 
was the divided political flavour of discussions, the formal negotiations contrasting with the 
vibrant debate about radical alternatives at the Global Forum.  
 
This division between the formal negotiations and the sub-politics (Beck, 1997) of 
sustainable development has continued through successive summits and was evident, albeit 
in a somewhat more muted form, at Rio+20 (at which the two main components were held 
at similar sites to 1992).  It has contributed to a juxtaposition of different views on, amongst 
other issues, the role of technology and innovation in achieving sustainable development at 
local and global levels (discussed in the next section).   
 
The documents emerging from Rio 1992 retained a similar focus on global technological 
solutions to Stockholm, but also moved towards a greater recognition of the local.  Whilst 
the Rio principles and the primary components of Agenda 21 – the action plan for 
sustainable development – kept the focus on transfer of modern technology from North to 
South, the recognition of community-led action through Local Agenda 21 also brought more 
attention to the potential for grassroots innovation. Principle 9 emerging from the Rio 1992 
conference emphasised co-operation for sustainable development “by improving scientific 
understanding through exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and by 
enhancing the development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including 
new and innovative technologies” (UNCED, 1992).  At the same time, NGOs were brought in 
as partners in the sustainable development process and Agenda 21 was developed for 
implementation not just at the global level but also “nationally and locally by organizations 
of the United Nations System, Governments, and Major Groups in every area in which 
human impacts on the environment” (United Nations, 1992).  Section 4, Chapter 34 stresses 
that tapping the pool of proprietary knowledge “and recombining it with local innovations 
to generate alternative technologies should be pursued” (United Nations, 1992). 
 
The Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, notable for its focus on 
industry-led approaches to sustainable development, nevertheless took some of these ideas 
forward. For example in the energy sector:  section II, part 20(g) called on governments to 
“develop and utilize indigenous energy sources and infrastructures for various local uses and 
promote rural community participation, including local Agenda 21 groups, with the support 
of the international community, in developing and utilizing renewable energy technologies 
to meet their daily energy needs to find simple and local solutions” (WSSD, 2002b).  
 
The formal framing of technologically-advanced knowledge and expensive hardware being 
transferred (primarily from North to South) has therefore remained dominant throughout 
successive conferences. However civil society has often advocated radically different 
innovation processes – both those for the creation of technologies and for the transitions of 
socio-technical and ecological systems that they might enable (Smith, 2012).  These 
alternative approaches – often no less knowledge intensive, but linked to more locally-
derived, ‘bottom-up’ efforts to transform systems of production and consumption - can be 
characterised and compared to technology transfer approaches by identifying a number of 
dichotomies. 
 
 
Innovation for Sustainability: from dichotomies to hybrids  
 
Through these historical debates, then, it is possible to discern two broad approaches to 
promoting science, technology and innovation (STI) in the stretching and redefining of 
environmental limits, and in dealing with ecological stress. In terms of the ‘three pillars’ of 
sustainable development, both of these seek more environmentally sustainable outcomes, 
but differ in their social and economic priorities, and in the forms of transition that they 
envisage.  At the level of socio-techno-ecological systems at local and global levels, the 
protagonists of these approaches envisage different pathways (Leach et al., 2010) to 
sustainability and enact political strategies to try to ensure that they are realised. 
 
Whilst these are not hard-and-fast distinctions, it is possible to identify two ends of a 
spectrum of innovation for sustainable development that focus on distinct actors, 
mechanisms, and knowledges.  The first is led by large firms, or by public-private 
partnerships of multinationals and governments advocating a science-push, and top-down 
form of STI. Whilst the OECD and others argued for this approach at Stockholm (Brooks 
Report), few governments and businesses really adopted it seriously until after Rio in 1992, 
and when it became known generally as ecological modernization (Hajer, 1995) and 
associated with planning approaches such as industrial ecology (Frosch, 1992).  It later 
attained greater influence through the public-private partnerships for implementing 
sustainable development at Johannesburg in 2002 (WSSD, 2002a), and later became 
influential in green economy arguments at the Rio+20 Summit.  Driven by market values and 
business interests (e.g. ‘cleantech venture capital’), with government support (e.g. through 
the clean development mechanism and, more recently, green stimulus packages). This 
approach – which we call green industrialisation - has traditionally emerged from innovation 
in the Global North, with diffusion and transfer to the South the most visible approach in 
formal intergovernmental negotiations and outcomes.   
 
Green industrialisation approaches emerging in and around Rio+20 include the Global Green 
Growth Institute (3Gi), the World Bank’s initiatives around its report on ‘Inclusive Green 
Growth’ (World Bank, 2012), the OECD’s work on green growth and sustainable 
development, green growth in developing countries and consumption, innovation and the 
environment and the Green Growth Knowledge Platform (itself supported by the 3Gi, World 
Bank, UNEP and the OECD).   
 
The second approach is rooted more centrally in civil society, and argues for a more 
participatory, bottom-up form of knowledge production and innovation for sustainability 
that responds to local situations and the interests and values of the communities involved. 
After Stockholm it found a focus in appropriate and alternative technology debates, and 
became associated with Local Agenda 21 after Rio in 1992 (Smith, 2005). This grassroots 
innovation approach for STI, driven by citizen action and emphasizing social justice concerns, 
was more prevalent in and around the People’s Summit, beyond the inter-governmental 
negotiations at Rio+20.   
 
In contrast to the green industrialisation approach, grassroots initiatives are understood to 
seek to practise deeper, alternative forms of sustainable development – forwarding a more 
transformative agenda around the reorientation and transformation of socio-technical 
systems.  These forms of innovation emerge both in the global South (e.g. in rural 
development), and from community action in the North (e.g. community energy projects), 
and have in both contexts represented an alternative to the industrialisation approach 
(Gupta, 2009; Seyfang and Smith, 2007). 
 
The primary characteristics of each approach – albeit highly stylised - are indicated in Table 
1, which maps the actors, mechanisms and knowledge-related components of the 
innovation processes, in each case, as well as some examples of ‘emblematic innovations’.  
 
Table 1. Green industrialisation and grassroots approaches to innovation for sustainable 
development 
 
Characteristics Global - Green 
industrialisation  approaches 
Local - Grassroots 
innovation approaches 
Political dimensions  
Predominant actors Corporations 
National governments 
International agencies 
Civil society 
Development-environment 
NGOs 
International agencies 
Priority values Private profit Social justice  
Relevant 
(inter)national 
political arena 
Formal inter-governmental 
negotiations interacting with 
corporate strategies 
 
CDM as an exemplar from 
UNFCCC 
Social movements and ’sub-
politics’ 
 
 
Local Agenda 21 as a rare 
exemplar in ‘formal’ 
negotiations 
Mechanisms 
Principal incentives/ 
drivers 
Market demand and 
regulation 
Co-operation and 
community empowerment 
Sources of 
investment 
State-/ corporate-funded, 
venture capital 
Ethical investment funds, 
community finance, 
hobbyists (where financial 
support required), 
development aid 
Forms of 
appropriability 
Strong patent-based 
intellectual property 
framework 
Not appropriated – seen as 
common goods 
Knowledge dimensions 
Sites of innovation Laboratories and R&D 
institutes 
Board rooms and Ministries 
Market-serving firms based in 
the global North 
Community projects and 
participatory processes 
Social movements and 
solidarity economy in both 
North and South 
Forms of knowledge 
privileged 
Scientific and technical 
knowledge 
Local, situated knowledge 
Emblematic 
innovations 
Carbon capture and storage 
Hydrogen fuel cells 
IP-driven transgenic crops 
Smart homes 
§§§ 
Micro-hydro 
Solar home systems 
Organic food 
Farmer-led seed production 
Vernacular housing 
§§§ 
 
Such dichotomies echo those in wider discourses in environment-development politics, such 
as those offered by Tim O’Riordan (1976) (techno-fixes versus ecologists) or John Dryzek 
(1997) (discourses on environment); as well as in development  (industrial blueprints versus 
participatory processes; developmentalism versus post-development; market-led vs. social 
paradigms) (Rist, 2011). As discussed earlier, these two contrasting approaches to STI have 
been reflected in all summits, from Stockholm to Rio+20. 
 
However, such stylised representations may in fact hide other forms and styles of 
innovation. These two approaches are instead best understood as ‘ends of the spectrum’, 
within which a range of hybrid possibilities lie.  As we discuss below, this traditional 
dichotomy is increasingly being supplemented by a space of diverse experimentation in 
hybrid forms of STI for sustainability between these poles. Nevertheless, conventional 
tensions between these approaches are creating a splintering and reconfiguring, making 
way for a new politics of innovation for sustainability. 
 
  
 
 
Hybrid innovation for sustainability 
 
Alongside and sometimes obscured by traditional dichotomies, we argue that we are 
increasingly witnessing the emergence of a more diverse variety of hybridizations between 
different approaches to STI for development, that actually bridge previously more distinct 
sustainability discourses. Hybrids operate across many different dimensions (political, actors 
and mechanisms, knowledge). They include, for instance, grassroots innovation movements 
adapting high-tech devices and infrastructures (especially to share digitally-encoded ideas 
through open-source peer production networks, such as Hackerspaces) (Anderson, 2012), 
corporations innovating products for marginal consumers at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ 
(Prahalad, 2004), disparate communities of individuals working voluntarily across 
international borders towards shared global challenges or for political advocacy (Shirky, 
2008), efforts to support the application of technologies in informal sector enterprises 
(Cozzens and Sutz, 2012), or to bring together networks and movements combining 
traditional knowledge and laboratory research to generate accessible and effective plant-
based (pharmaceutical/ cosmetic/ food products)(Gupta, 2009).   
 
Thus, instead of the dichotomies outlined in table 1, we see innovation processes that 
involve actors from across both not-for-profit and private sectors (but primarily from 
outside government) in dynamic alliances and relationships that form outside traditional 
political arenas. Many hybrids embody values that can be described as ‘not just for profit’ 
and link both to business values but also co-operative motivations for green or social 
enterprise.  They are financed by specialised venture capital, by microfinance or increasingly 
by crowd-sourced capital, and adopt an openness with respect to data and innovation 
processes that is absent in traditional ‘green industrialisation’ approaches.  The hybrid 
innovations that we are increasingly witnessing are able to draw on multiple forms of 
knowledge and bridge across sites of formal R&D and more bottom-up, community-based 
ingenuity.  
 
The examples below – purposefully chosen to give a historical perspective - illustrate this 
hybridity further by comparing the oppositional approaches since the 1970s with current 
networked, multi-level, transformative approaches in two sectors: agricultural (primarily 
seed) innovation and wind-based power generation.  
 
Sustainable intensification and crowd-sourced agricultural strategies 
 
Institutional infrastructures comprising networked national agricultural research systems 
and CGIAR Centres have led the development of ‘industrial’ agricultural technologies since 
the 1970s, drawing on breeding techniques and genetics research pioneered and applied in 
(especially US) seed firms.  Alongside these international efforts, farmer-led agricultural 
development (Chambers et al 1989) offered an alternative to green revolution discourses 
and focussed on farmers’ own local knowledge that was so often overlooked by 
professionals in the research system. This dichotomy has been visible ever since, especially 
in conflicts around the use of genetic technologies and resources (Scoones and Thompson 
2011).   
 
Whilst formal debates around agriculture and genetic resources at the Johannesburg 
summit focussed on access and benefit sharing under the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
conflicting visions over the applicability of various agricultural technologies (especially the 
use of transgenic crops) raged.  The farmer participatory plant breeding movement was 
counter-posed as an alternative to various applications of genetic technologies (largely 
controlled by a small group of multinational corporations), and the International Agreement 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (otherwise known as the ‘International 
Seed Treaty’, which aimed to secure ‘farmers’ rights’ to such resources) had been agreed 
the year before.   
 
Johannesburg was also less than one year before the USA, allied with other large grain 
exporting countries (among the third parties Australia, Argentina, Canada) launched the 
‘world’s biggest food fight’ – dispute DS291 on European ‘Measures Affecting the Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products’.  The role of agricultural biotechnologies in intensive, 
industrial agriculture was clearly delineated from the low external input sustainable 
agriculture favoured by a strong international network of civil society groups working on 
food security (and, later, food sovereignty) (Millstone and Van Zwanenberg, 2003). 
 
More recently, with the larger ‘developing’ countries (especially Argentina and Brazil) 
embracing the use of transgenic crops, and technological developments enabling cisgenics 
and marker-assisted selection to bridge across to conventional or participatory breeding 
techniques, the potential for hybrids (literally) is increasing.  Whilst organisations such as 
Cambia have attempted to provide open-source (transgenic) models in this area, 
international legal frameworks are gradually overcoming the barriers for international 
collaborative work bridging local, situated and scientific forms of knowledge.  The 
International Seed Treaty’s attempts to ease the flow of genetic material internationally 
through its ‘Easy-SMTA’ (Standard Material Transfer Agreements) contributes to easier 
genetic exchange, and its global information system 
(http://www.planttreaty.org/content/gis) also helps by linking with the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’s Clearing House Mechanism.  The Nagoya Protocol on Access and 
Benefit Sharing now provides a framework (although far from ready for implementation) for 
globally-networked, hybrid innovation approaches.     
 
In this context, a number of hybrid innovation initiatives are emerging. For example, ‘citizen 
scientists’ have been drawing together modern agricultural biotechnology and local farmer 
knowledge around seed saving and exchange, conserving diverse traditional varieties and 
experimenting with non-industrial supply channels (Stilgoe, 2009).   Participatory plant 
breeding, involving alliances between farmers and scientists, has been shown to improve 
the quality and speed of plant breeding, as in India (Walker 2006; Witcombe et al 2011) or in 
France at INRA (The Institute for Agronomic Research) which  has focussed on maintaining 
diversity in cauliflower seeds through work with NGOs like Réseau Semences Paysannes (the 
Peasants’ Seeds Network).   
 
More recently, researchers  have pointed to the potential of combining open source 
approaches to knowledge sharing with modern biotechnologies for agricultural 
development (Adenle et al., 2012). The considerable potentials of lab-based genomics with 
field-based farmer assessments have been highlighted as a way of radically changing the 
way plant breeding is practised, drawing on very different sources of knowledge (Offei et al, 
2010; Richards et al, 2009). Others have pointed towards the potential of hybrid innovation 
approaches that combine bioinformatic and communications technologies with farmer 
participation, bridging high-tech and participatory approaches through crowdsourcing 
approaches to seed innovation. Such approaches, using mobile devices for information 
sourcing and open access software for data management for examples, offer hybrid 
approaches which are “not only be scalable, but also inclusive through the strengthening of 
crop diversity as an open informational resource” (Van Etten, 2011). 
 
Hybrid wind energy formation 
 
Wind energy is frequently referred to within the green industrialisation approach to STI. It is 
a relative market success in sustainable technology, with huge growth and investment led 
by utilities and institutional investment funds. It is interesting (for the purposes of this paper 
at least) that the origins of this successful industry rest in grassroots innovation approaches, 
specifically in Denmark. 
 
Wind energy began its significant international expansion in the early 1990s.2 The fact that 
Danish turbine designs in the late 1980s could generate 70 to 100 per cent more electricity 
than competitors, owing to a more robust and reliable design (Karnøe, 1996, p.773), meant 
the former were well-placed to lead in the new markets. By the turn of the century, the 
Danish wind energy industry was world leader, with a turnover of €3 billion, employing over 
20,000 people, commanding 50 per cent of the world market.3 Competition has intensified 
since then, but largely around the same turbine design as that pioneered by Danish 
manufacturers. Manufacturers in Germany and, unsurprisingly, China are taking increasing 
                                                 
2
 This section draws upon material in Smith (2006). 
3
  Data supplied by the Danish Wind Industry Association. 
shares in regional markets (Lema and Lema, 2012). But the expansion of wind energy 
continues, and has become an archetype for ecological modernization discourses and clean 
tech innovation policy. 
 
Often overlooked are the roots of this development. Danish environmentalists, who like 
those elsewhere wanted alternatives to the nuclear power vision being pushed by states 
and some electricity utilities, were also highly practical in reclaiming wind energy 
technologies overlooked since the 1940s. Turbine designs can be traced back to the Danish 
grassroots environmentalist milieu opposed to nuclear energy in the early 1970s, but also 
embedded in a culture of collaborative craft production and a tradition of co-operative 
organisation that, in many respects, anticipated the open source movement. Social 
networks built up which shared knowledge, experience and ideas about turbine 
construction and use. The Organisation for Renewable Energy4 held wind meetings, and 
disseminated test results and other information about different turbine designs and 
products through its monthly magazine Naturilig Energi (Natural Energy). A social innovation 
– a new form of community-based wind co-operative – facilitated investment in turbines for 
local use, and thereby helped create a market. Some local agricultural machinery 
manufacturers noticed this niche market, and, enterprisingly, began manufacturing wind 
turbines. In both cases, the designs drew on past, practical experience, and tended to be 
robustly made owing to the craft-based engineering skills and tools available. 
 
The grassroots were also lobbying government to support their cause. The (pro-nuclear) 
electricity utilities needed to be persuaded into connecting community turbines to the 
electricity grid. Government support to this effect did eventually occur, as did the creation 
of a testing and research facility for the use of small turbine manufacturers at the 
government’s Risø laboratory. This further helped develop practical experience with 
different design options, co-ordinate standards, and certify the viability of turbines. Support 
for the grassroots initiatives was by no means easily forthcoming, but what support there 
was seemed to work. Indeed, learning-by-doing had improved reliability and performance to 
such a degree that the government announced investment subsidies for turbine installations 
in the early 1980s. This made it easier for wind co-operatives to purchase and install grid-
connected turbines for local electricity supply. Danish turbine manufacturers also 
performed relatively well in the Californian wind-rush of 1980 to 1986. The Danish wind 
energy industry began its international emergence. 
 
As they emerged, grassroots approaches gained international attention.  The people’s 
summit at Rio 1992 focussed a great deal of attention on distributed wind energy, and such 
approaches were referred to for example in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, 
which called on governments to fulfil their common but differentiated responsibilities 
around energy, including “actions at all levels to: (g) Develop and utilize indigenous energy 
sources and infrastructures for various local uses and promote rural community 
participation, including local Agenda 21 groups, with the support of the international 
community, in developing and utilizing renewable energy technologies to meet their daily 
energy needs to find simple and local solutions” (WSSD, 2002b).   
 
                                                 
4
  It was created in 1975.  Preben Maegaard, a ‘grassroots engineer’ played a part in its creation, as well as establishing the Northern Jutland 
Centre for Alternative Technology (Jamison, 2002, p.4). 
As mentioned above, wind energy is now a large, high-tech engineering industry. Co-
operatively owned wind turbines pioneered in Denmark have been superseded by large 
utility- and investor-owned wind parks using giant turbines greater than 3MW (100 times 
more powerful than earlier 30kW turbines). This clean tech industry has come a long way 
from the back-yard idealists and grassroots innovators. And yet, this move from the 
grassroots towards one more akin to ‘green industrialisation’ is accompanied by other 
hybridisations. Community-owned energy projects are growing in popularity in some 
locations, such as the US and Europe. And grassroots innovators continue to experiment 
with small turbine designs for local, low power use, typically in remote rural locations; 
sometimes in response to diminishing turbine supply options at smaller scales suitable to 
community energy projects, and arising from the dominance of big wind. 
 
These examples from the agriculture and energy sectors – like other innovation approaches 
in different sectors - transcend the grassroots/ green industrialisation dichotomies above by 
being the product of both community level ingenuity and industrial technologies, being 
driven both by the profit motive (associated with varying levels of appropriation and 
different sources of investment) and social values,  and by drawing on multiple forms of 
knowledge – both technical and non-technical – and recombining them to produce new 
ways of responding to sustainable development challenges.   
 
At the same time, in many cases these approaches begin to bridge earlier ‘global/local’ (top-
down/ bottom-up) divisions by being at once sensitive to local contexts but applicable – in 
altered and adapted forms – across diverse regions.  The existence of these hybrid 
approaches at Rio+20 offered the promise that benefits previously seen only in localities 
could be translated to greater scales.   
 
Scholars of grassroots innovation elsewhere (Smith et al., forthcoming), however, describe 
how these kinds of innovations need simultaneously to fit into existing socio-technical-
ecological systems whilst in many cases simultaneously attempting to destabilise and 
transform them to create more sustainable systems of consumption and production.  
Translation from the local to global scales thus brings with it the hope (and threat) of wider 
transformational change as these innovations reconfigure social relations and create 
greener, more inclusive and socially-just economies.  It is this potential for transitions and 
transformational change, and yet the power relations often stacked against such alternative 
pathways (Smith, 2007), that brings with hybrid innovation approaches a new politics – one 
that is worthy of further discussion and analysis. 
 
The 3D politics of hybrid innovation 
 
The hybrid innovation approaches described above are more dynamic, complex and 
unpredictable than the green industrialisation approaches that national governments and 
intergovernmental negotiations have been used to dealing with.  They also go beyond the 
grassroots approaches, linking to new sources of innovation and market players. They entail 
more varied and unstable relations between actors, mechanisms and knowledges than 
either green industrialisation or grassroots approaches imply. As a consequence, hybrid 
innovation approaches entail a novel politics, structured by new power relations.  
 
These novel politics involve tensions between winners and losers, and relate to power and 
control over innovation pathways, processes and outcomes, which the diverse actors 
involved struggle to negotiate.  Across hybrid alliances, not all participating organisations 
are equally endowed; each brings their resources to the partnership – profiting from 
interdependencies whilst attempting to secure continued access and control (Smith, 2006b).  
Tensions can arise as alliances and innovation processes shape current and future access to 
information, knowledge, technology, authority and finance, especially where developing 
infrastructures and formal agreements can harden asymmetrical relationships.  Specifically, 
a number of perennially contentious issues form sites of tension and negotiation within, and 
characterising, the new hybrid politics of innovation, as transformative pathways to 
sustainability are sought: 
 
- Appropriation – many hybrid approaches adopt non-traditional models of 
intellectual property such as open source or forms of creative commons licensing. 
These are in many cases unfamiliar to those organisations from the ‘green 
industrialisation’ approach and some new models of appropriation may meet with 
resistance from the ‘old guard’. For example, several not-for profit initiatives in the 
agricultural biotechnology field described above have encountered problems 
attempting to secure freedom to operate within an area traditionally dominated by 
strict patent control.  Open source, peer-production and international collaboration 
via the web can often struggle to link effectively with business models that (despite 
open innovation rhetorics) see copying as unfair competition and invest resources in 
preventing it (Benkler and Nissenbaum, 2006). 
 
- Commodification – within emerging regulatory regimes attempting to place a 
monetary value on polluting emissions (e.g. CO2), or potentially on biodiversity or 
ecosystem services, green enterprise is often seen as commodifying lifeworlds and 
nature itself (Fairhead et al 2012).  Through focussing only on aspects of 
development and conservation that are viable within existing economic systems, 
however, these approaches can contradict post-development values rooted in local 
cultures and reduce diversity in social, technological and ecological systems.   Many 
of the hybrid approaches straddle growth/degrowth debates and are therefore open 
to critique, and contentious politics amongst, actors aligned with multiple positions 
in critical debates about ‘green economy’ (see above).  
 
- Risk governance – with the forging of new innovation pathways come risks, 
uncertainties, ambiguities and ignorance (Stirling, 1998).  Responsibility for the 
potentially negative impacts of innovation is negotiated alongside control and access 
to the benefits, raising significant challenges for globally-co-ordinated but locally 
implemented regulation (Van Zwanenberg et al., 2011).  Whilst traditional ‘green 
industrialisation’ approaches were driven by relatively observable, manageable and 
accountable centres of innovation, distributed crowd-sourced solutions defy easy 
monitoring and accountability.  This is especially salient in more open approaches to 
emerging areas in biotechnology, nanotechnology, and digital manufacturing, where 
intellectual property enforcement cannot be used to exclude ‘unapproved’ actors, 
and where even the reach of health and safety legislation is tenuous. 
 
- Market and non-market mechanisms – whilst traditional political responses to green 
industrialisation models relied on economic instruments and market mechanisms 
favouring incumbents or conventional business models, emerging hybrids often rely 
more on the role of (co-operative) networks and solidarity economies to disrupt 
incumbent economic arrangements and may therefore be incompatible with 
conventional policy goals.  Collective consumption (for example car clubs) to reduce 
environmental impact also act to reduce traditional measures of economic 
development (GDP) (Albinsson and Perera, 2012).  Even potentially potent 
innovations for sustainability struggle to survive within existing structural constraints. 
 
- Investment challenges – again constrained by structural economic barriers, hybrid 
innovations – when they require external funding – struggle to access venture capital 
from traditional sources that hold particular expectations around returns, time-
frames and size of investment and are wary of opportunity costs (when comparing 
more complex investments to more traditional ‘green industrialisation’ approaches).  
At the same time, when state support is called upon, vulnerability to capture by key 
incumbents and to economic cycles (as seen in Rio+20) can cause further political 
tensions (as can be argued has been the case with support for wind against a 
background of fossil fuel incumbency). 
 
- Diverse settings - these politics are not played out in the familiar arenas of 
governmental/ intergovernmental conferences but through the processes of 
alliance-building and innovation itself. Actors can find it uncomfortable and difficult 
to operate beyond familiar sites, suggesting a need for professionals who are able to 
bridge across to more dynamic domains of corporate-civil society alliances, open-
source movements and development groups working in diverse contexts around the 
world (Leach and Scoones 2006). 
 
- Distributed knowledge - hybrid approaches must wrestle with both global 
scientifically determined notions of sustainability, and with other – more situated - 
understandings based on local cultural perspectives, priorities and epistemologies.  
Bridging such disparate epistemologies of sustainability – elsewhere termed 
‘sustainability brokering’ (Leach et al., 2012) - is therefore key, but also a process 
entangled with sometimes-fraught politics of knowledge. 
 
These tensions were evident in debates at Rio+20. Taking them seriously, we see that the 
new politics of (hybrid) innovation lies in the negotiation and settlement on which pathways 
of change emerge at different levels – where pathways refer to intertwined and mutually 
supportive social, technological, ecological, economic, institutional and knowledge 
processes (Leach et al 2010). Corporatist-managerialist approaches of business strategy, 
providing financial support and creating a regulatory framework that provides market 
signals to drive green industrialisation are therefore insufficient to enhance or even keep up 
with hybrid innovation approaches.  As researchers from the STEPS Centre, our role in side-
events at Rio+20, building on our research into innovation for sustainability, was to suggest 
a ‘3D’ political agenda for innovation – around direction, distribution and diversity – that can 
act as a heuristic in understanding some of the tensions above and for guiding innovation 
and its politics in these emerging hybrid areas. 
 
Firstly, more attention is required to the orientation of the specific directions of social, 
technological and environmental change that hybrid innovations especially help engender. 
Beyond being clear on the particular goals and principles driving innovation (for example 
meeting specific MDGs whilst avoiding environmental stresses), this involves a recognition 
that multiple possible pathways are indeed available, but that particular courses of action – 
involving interacting social, technological and environmental processes - will be self-
reinforcing, narrowing our options for future pathways.  An attention to directions therefore 
requires a reflexivity towards these processes of closing down and an open, transparent 
politics to enable their full implications (and associated contestations and trade-offs) to be 
explored.  Thus in the wind case above, for example, alternative directions range from large-
scale, grid-networked approaches (involving massive investment in infrastructure and 
hardware) to distributed, smaller-scale initiatives amenable to community ownership and 
control.  The kinds of mechanisms driving China’s goal of building 1000GW of installed wind 
capacity by 2050 (Liu, 2012) are not likely to bring about the kinds of societal 
transformations advocated in the Hog Farm.   The decisions around which of these is 
favoured in particular contexts reinforce or detract from future directions for low carbon 
development. 
 
In recognising the potential for different directions of innovation, a second component of a 
3D agenda is the associated distribution of costs, benefits and risks resulting from these 
potential pathways. Questions of distribution relate to who gains and who loses from 
particular policies and innovations, who controls them as they move forward (or, conversely, 
who is empowered by the process of innovation), and who bears responsibility for ensuring 
that the sustainability benefits of certain courses of action are not outweighed by negative 
effects on more marginal groups within society.  The distribution component of the 3D 
agenda recognises the social justice implications of innovation processes as well as 
outcomes.  This includes the configuration of innovations themselves, rather than focussing 
simply on reallocation of resources derived from innovation ex post.  In the agricultural 
biotechnology example above, a private-sector driven approach to transgenic crops 
modified to withstand particular herbicides has had significant productivity impacts on 
large-scale, export-led soya cultivation in Latin America, for example, serving wealthier 
farmers and enabling some subsequent redistribution (Marin and Smith, 2012).  Alternative 
approaches to plant genomics relying less on patent-protected transgenic varieties and 
chemical-intensive agriculture, might offer more equally distributed and sustainable gains 
across the economy and society. 
 
In trying to reconcile these different perspectives and trade-offs, the 3D agenda for hybrid 
innovation recognises the crucial importance of fostering diversity in any given field.  This is 
so, equally in terms of maintaining a diversity of knowledges and ways of doing things that 
can contribute to sustainable development in the future; in terms of harnessing 
experimentation in diverse new innovation directions, and in terms of ‘fitting’ innovation to 
diverse places and contexts, attention to combinations of approaches to addressing specific 
sustainability objectives is required.  For example, whilst green or social enterprise 
initiatives may seek to scale up their own business models within a particular area, the 
dominance of more profitable or efficient models can close down spaces for 
experimentation with alternatives (Smith, 2007).  Although the detailed ways such diversity 
is seen will vary across perspectives, diversity in general can be defined as an evenly 
balanced variety of disparate options (Stirling, 2007). It is in these terms that diversity allows 
us better to respond to ignorance arising from complex technological, environmental and 
socio-political dynamics, guards against lock-in to dominant (and sometimes unsustainable) 
pathways and provides a stronger foundation for future recombinations of knowledge and 
resources that fuel innovation.  
 
We now turn to asking how and to what extent the Rio+20 conference dealt with the ‘3D’ 
politics of hybrid innovation, and what role might future intergovernmental exercises play in 
facilitating and supporting hybrid innovation approaches into the future? 
 
 
Rio+20 and the role of International Sustainable Development Summits 
 
At Rio+20 the UN adopted a convening role, trying to facilitate alliances between actors and 
– notably – moving far beyond the traditional intergovernmental frame to adopt a new 
organisational role as a partnership broker:  
 
“The UN once dealt only with governments.  But now we know that peace and prosperity 
cannot be achieved without partnerships involving governments, international organizations, 
the business community and civil society.  In today’s world, we depend on each other”  
(Kofi Annan addressing the WEF 1999, quoted in Dodds et al., 2012, page 231).  
 
At Rio+20, the negotiations retained a similarly structured and formal approach to previous 
summits, but the side events were left more open, with more approved non-governmental 
organisations attending than ever before - allowing space for hybridization, plurality and the 
formation of rapid and dynamic partnerships and networks. This convening/ brokering role 
involved providing a repository for voluntary commitments from across governments, the 
private sector and civil society. $513 billion of voluntary commitments were recorded, such 
as “empowering 5000 women entrepreneurs in green economy businesses in Africa”, and 
recycling 800,000 tonnes of PVC per year (UN News Centre, 2012).   It was also illustrated by 
the conference’s brokering hybrid interactions via a ‘partnerships forum’, session 4 of which 
was entitled “Speed-Brokering for Partnerships: Scaling Up and Replicating Best Practices in 
Sustainable Development” and focused on the themes of energy, sustainable cities, and 
water (United Nations, 2012). 
  
Alongside this reinvigorated focus on partnerships, the UN had made efforts to involve the 
wider global community in the run-up to the conference and the Secretary General of 
Rio+20, Sha Zukang, claimed that 50 million people “took part” in the event via social media 
(UN News Centre, 2012). The ‘Rio+20 Dialogues’ (http://vote.riodialogues.org/) attempted 
to bring wider civil society into the process through a networked, virtual approach to 
formulating recommendations.  Rio+20 saw the emergence of a global citizens’ movement 
for sustainable development – working together with the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs but largely in the absence of inputs from individual nation states. 
The People’s summit, including numerous parallel sessions (but no formal outcome 
document) drew together civil society and support from the private sector, transcending 
and blurring some of the differences between types of actor that divided the industrial and 
grassroots approaches and that had been prevalent in previous summits. 
 
At the same time, however, the speed of these interactions and dynamic nature of the 
political connections being formed left the UN - and indeed member states – struggling to 
keep up. The forms that dialogue took, and the character of the negotiation spaces and 
texts, often served more to quell and disable resistance to dominant political-economic and 
market agendas rather than to encourage sharp debate. There was therefore insufficient 
opportunity for exploring the 3D aspects in the politics of emerging innovation processes.  
Whereas one UN agenda and plan of implementation at Rio in 1992 and Johannesburg in 
2002 may have seemed reasonable, Rio+20 revealed how impossible such a managerial 
approach is in the current context, and reinforced the need for an ongoing open politics of 
innovation for sustainability.   The fragile ‘green economy’ narrative, even if suffixed by 
‘poverty alleviation and sustainable development’, provided little more than a political 
vacuum in terms of empowering more grassroots-led innovation processes, and at least in 
terms of the formal outputs of the conference, the post-crisis governmental focus on 
economic growth enabled powerful industrial approaches to fill the gap.  It is likely that a 
disproportionate share of the $513 billion allegedly pledged in voluntary commitments for 
sustainable development will support large firms through industrial and export promotion 
policies in wealthier countries. Hardware and finance within a green economy were – as 
mentioned above – the primary content of the outcome document ‘The Future We Want’.  
As a result, in place of agreed mappings of alternatives, there were concerns about co-
option, control and capture around particular privileged forms of knowledge and innovation. 
Questions were closed down around key topics like research agendas, intellectual property 
rights, risk governance, and new models for business and investment.   
 
Like the activists in Stockholm before them, civil society organisations at Rio+20 believed 
that responses to conjoined environmental and economic crises have to empower wider 
social steering of innovation. The Green Economy Coalition of NGOs, inter-governmental 
organizations and private actors developed a shared alternative discourse to respond to 
such critiques (Green Economy Coalition, 2012). However, insufficient attention was given 
to these debates in the inter-governmental process.  The green and fair economy vision 
tries to maintain space to enable and empower grassroots innovation, as well as the clean 
tech approaches favoured by states and corporations. The lack of attention let alone 
concessions to these processes of empowerment in the outcome document suggests that 
grassroots innovation approaches and even more the hybrid approaches described above 
remained marginal. Efforts to incorporate these dynamic politics into the formal 
negotiations were – regrettably - absent.  
 
Many of the UN outcomes of Rio+20 (such as the establishment of the Rio+ Centre, the 
UNEP Sustainable Consumption and Production programme and the new incarnation of the 
UN Commission on Sustainable Development), point to means of sharing experiences, but 
without intervening politically.  However the conflicts described above underline that 
attention to the politics of innovation processes is required if future negotiations and 
multilateral efforts are to succeed.  Rather than focussing around traditional faultlines and 
dichotomies, we propose that these politics attend instead to the directions of innovation, 
the distribution of the associated costs, benefits and risks and the diversity of innovation 
approaches that are enabled and supported in any given area. 
 
This leads us to propose a new role for the UN and for future summits (or more networked, 
virtual alternatives) – one that has already begun to emerge at Rio+20 – of guiding and 
convening, rather than managing innovation for sustainability.  Alongside this brokering role, 
however, an ongoing requirement of international sustainable development summits will be 
to provide a space where different innovation approaches can be debated openly, so that 
the ‘3D’ implications of various forms of grassroots innovation and green industrialisation 
(and hybrids thereof) can be explored and negotiated in the most globally-networked and 
politically accountable arena currently available. 
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